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Key Elements of the Proposal
To enable a green and socially just recovery for all countries, public debt problems need to 
be urgently addressed so that all governments have the fiscal space to finance crucial 
health and social spending and invest in a green and inclusive recovery.
We propose a Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery Initiative as an ambitious, 
concerted, and comprehensive debt relief initiative – to be adopted on a global scale – that 
frees up resources to support recoveries in a sustainable way, boosts economies’ resilience, 
and fosters a just transition to a low-carbon economy.
Eligibility should be a function of debt sustainability, which should be determined in a Debt 
Sustainability Assessment carried out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, with inputs from other institutions. Debt Sustainability Assessments need to 
be based on realistic assumptions and account for climate risks.
If a Debt Sustainability Assessment asserts that the sovereign debt of a country is of signif-
icant concern, the G20 should coordinate with all bilateral and multilateral creditors about 
a debt restructuring, and the IMF should make its programmes conditional on a sovereign 
debt restructuring involving private creditors.
Reforms that align policies and budgets with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development & the Paris Agreement
Brady-type credit enhancement to facilitate access to capital markets
Pillar 1




with creditors swapping their 
old debt with a haircut for new 
«Green Recovery Bonds»
Pillar 3
Facilitating a green and 
inclusive recovery through 
debt swaps and new 
SDG-aligned debt instruments
Heavily indebted countries with an unsustainable debt burden Countries that are not
heavily indebted
Enhanced Debt Sustainability Analysis
Fig. 6: Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery
Debt Relief for and Inclusive Recovery Green 
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Governments receiving debt relief would need to commit to reforms that align their policies 
and budgets with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement. 
Our proposal consists of three pillars and aims at achieving maximum creditor and debtor 
participation:
Pillar 1: Comprehensive debt relief for eligible heavily indebted countries by public 
       creditors that is analogous to, but improves upon, the HIPC Initiative.
Pillar 2: Private-sector involvement, with private creditors swapping their old debt 
       holdings with a haircut for new «Green Recovery Bonds».
Pillar 3: Debt-for-climate or debt-for-sustainability swaps for countries that are not 
       heavily indebted, but have reduced fiscal space due to Covid-19.
Any new debt issued by countries participating in the Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive 
Recovery Initiative could receive Brady-type credit enhancement, which would help coun-
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Executive Summary
The Covid-19 crisis is the biggest threat to human prosperity in close to a century. Many 
emerging markets and developing economies are facing grave difficulties in obtaining the 
fiscal space to combat the virus, protect the vulnerable, and mount a green and inclusive 
recovery. Not only has the global economic slowdown hampered the ability of many devel-
oping nations to mobilise resources, many are using 30% to 70% of what little government 
revenue is coming in to service debt payments. This report calls for a global debt relief 
effort to grant emerging markets and developing countries in need the space necessary to 
fight the virus and put together a green and inclusive recovery.
The Group of 20 (G20) were swift to act in the early months of the crisis by establishing the 
Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which is now suspending debt service payments 
for a group of low-income countries through the first half of 2021. However, the standstill 
under the DSSI is merely provided some breathing space, but it did not address the core 
problems: It did not lead to a net reduction of debt, and it did not involve private creditors, 
who are holding large chunks of developing-country debt. Although it was an important 
first step, the G20 now recognise that, as the crisis has worsened, there is a need to go 
beyond the DSSI.
Back in April, when the G20 made its first gestures, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) predicted that emerging markets and developing countries would contract by 2.3% 
in 2020. As the situation has worsened, the IMF now sees emerging markets and develop-
ing countries contracting by 5.7% in 2020. The World Bank adds that upwards of 150 
million people worldwide will be pushed into extreme poverty as a result of the crisis by the 
end of 2020 – with 8 of 10 of those people in middle-income countries. What is more, 2020 
is already the second warmest year on record. Cyclones and hurricanes, wildfires, and 
droughts have been ravaging economies and livelihoods that had already been pushed to 
their limits. As these factors compound, capital continues to flee from many emerging 
markets and developing countries, putting downward pressure on exchange rates and 
ballooning debt levels. As an indicator of the looming systemic debt crisis, there have 
already been more credit rating downgrades for emerging markets and developing coun-
tries in 2020 than in all previous crises over the past 40 years.
In November 2020, the G20 has rightly come to the realisation that debt suspension will 
not be adequate for a number of countries, and put forward a «Common Framework for 
Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI». This proposes a reduction in overall debt levels on a 
case by case basis for those DSSI countries deemed to have unsustainable debt. This move 
is yet another welcome step in the right direction by the G20 but falls short on three counts. 
First, there are a number of middle income countries, including small island developing 
states, that may experience unsustainable debt that should be eligible for relief. Second, 
the G20's new framework still lacks a mechanism for meaningful private creditor 
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involvement and fails to address the first-mover problem for participating nations. Third, 
the new framework lacks a commitment by creditors and debtor countries alike to align 
newfound fiscal space with globally shared climate and development goals.
This crisis wracked the world economy just as it was ambitiously mobilising trillions of 
dollars annually to meet ambitious development goals and put the global economy on a 
path to decarbonisation by mid-century. It is not an option to put these goals aside as we 
attempt to recover from the pandemic. Rather, they have to be put at the centre of the 
recovery effort. The lack of attention to development goals and to climate change was 
already triggering social strife and leading to major economic costs before the pandemic.
This report calls on the G20 to move beyond its new Common Framework for Debt Treat-
ments and require all creditor groups to provide substantial debt relief to a broad set of 
low- and middle-income countries in need in exchange for a commitment to use some of the 
newfound fiscal space for a green and inclusive recovery. A piecemeal approach to dealing 
with the current debt problems will not suffice. This is a systemic problem, and we need a 
global and systemic response. The international community and the G20 in particular need 
to agree on an ambitious agenda for tackling the debt crisis and providing countries with 
the fiscal space for sustainable crisis responses.
The G20 need to be bold, and they need to act now. Past experience tells us that delaying 
the response to debt crises leads to worse outcomes and higher costs. Doing too little, too 
late will be costlier, for both debtors and creditors. The international community only 
agreed to a comprehensive initiative – the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initia-
tive – after more than two decades of repeated piecemeal debt reschedulings and progres-
sively increasing debt reductions. Postponing inevitable sovereign debt restructurings 
caused prolonged underinvestment in health, education, and infrastructure, and it resulted 
in lost decades with increased unemployment and poverty for the mostly African and Latin 
American countries suffocated by debt.
We need a new architecture that will provide debt relief to countries that require it, while 
ensuring that the relief is calibrated towards attacking the virus, protecting the vulnerable, 
and staging a green and inclusive economy.
To this end, we propose a «Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery Initiative» as an 
ambitious, concerted, and comprehensive debt relief initiative – to be adopted on a global 
scale – that frees up resources to support recoveries in a sustainable way, boosts econo-
mies’ resilience, and fosters a just transition to a low-carbon economy. Our proposal con-
sists of three pillars and aims at achieving maximum creditor and debtor participation.
Under Pillar 1, comprehensive debt relief would be granted by public creditors to eligible 
heavily indebted countries with an unsustainable debt burden – analogous to, but improving 
upon, the HIPC Initiative model. These countries would receive debt relief on their bilateral 
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and multilateral debt in order to provide the fiscal space for investment in health and social 
spending to fight the pandemic and in climate adaptation. Governments receiving debt 
relief would need to commit to reforms that align their policies and budgets with the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement. 
Eligibility should be a function of debt sustainability, which should be determined in a Debt 
Sustainability Assessment carried out by the IMF and the World Bank, with inputs from 
other institutions. Debt Sustainability Assessments need to be based on realistic assump-
tions and account for climate risks. If a Debt Sustainability Assessment asserts that the 
sovereign debt of a country is of significant concern, the G20 should coordinate with all 
bilateral and multilateral creditors about a debt restructuring, and the IMF should make 
its programmes conditional on a sovereign debt restructuring involving private creditors. 
Debtor countries that seek bilateral haircuts will be required to seek commensurate relief 
from private creditors, and incentives need to be designed to ensure that private creditors 
grant such relief. Lending by multilateral development banks and humanitarian assistance 
will continue to flow, but on condition that it is not used to pay private creditors. Debt owed 
by multilateral institutions would only be restructured for IDA-eligible countries. To safe-
guard the preferred creditor status of multilateral institutions, their losses would need to 
be financed by bilateral contributions, the proceeds from gold sales, or the issuance of new 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
Under Pillar 2, the same group of eligible countries would be granted debt relief by private 
creditors. Private creditors participating in the debt restructuring would swap their old 
debt holdings with a haircut for new «Green Recovery Bonds». As in the case of the restruc-
turing of publicly held debt under Pillar 1, a significant portion of the reduced debt service 
burden from the debt relief by private creditors should be used by the debtor government 
for spending on a green and inclusive recovery, and governments should commit to aligning 
their policies and public budgets with the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment and the Paris Agreement.
Any new debt issued by countries participating in the Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive 
Recovery Initiative could receive Brady-type credit enhancement – suitably adapted to 
current circumstances – in exchange for committing to dedicating receipts to SDG-aligned 
spending items. Such a credit enhancement mechanism would help countries undergoing 
debt restructuring under the Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery Initiative to 
continue to have access to international capital markets.
Under Pillar 3, we envisage debt-for-climate swaps for countries that are not heavily indebt-
ed, but have reduced fiscal space due to Covid-19. For these, such swaps would facilitate 
raising climate ambitions in the form of additional actions or investments in climate 
adaptation or mitigation. Moreover, this could be complemented by an incentive scheme for 
the issuance of (new) sustainability-aligned sovereign debt.
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For any of these transactions, an independent third party would need to oversee the imple-
mentation and monitor the fulfilment of the government’s obligations under the arrange-
ment and measure their impact.
Our proposal is aimed at providing developing countries the fiscal space at a critical time 
to address the three crises they are facing: the health and social crisis, the debt crisis, and 
the climate and environmental crisis. We highlight climate action on mitigation and adap-
tation for three reasons. First, without reducing emissions and stabilising our climate as 
well as investing in adaptation, all other efforts at development will be undermined and 
countries will find themselves in permanent crisis mode. Second, even if climate mitigation 
efforts are successful, large-scale investments in adaptation will be needed to protect 
people from the effects of the global environmental change that is already happening. It is 
important to emphasise that the effects of climate change will disproportionately harm the 
poor – scaling-up climate adaptation is also a matter of climate justice. Third, research has 
shown that greater climate vulnerability is increasing sovereign risk and the cost of capital, 
and hence undermining public finances. Therefore, investment in adaptation is a good 
investment and will contribute to future debt sustainability.
But to be clear, neither the efforts aimed at climate mitigation nor adaptation can be 
successful if the social dimension is ignored. Throughout this report, we stress that it is 
crucial that the recovery be green, economically inclusive, and socially just. Debt relief 
needs to be coupled with policies that are aimed at a just transition. To ensure that the 
recovery is both green and inclusive, investments in sustainable infrastructure and targeted 
support of key industries are essential, alongside investments in people and innovation to 
ensure that such a transition generates full employment, decent work, and opportunities for 
new economic activity.
Debt relief has to be part of a broader agenda for enabling green and inclusive recoveries in 
countries around the world. A debt relief effort such as the one we propose should be 
coupled with a new and ambitious allocation of SDRs and significant new capital mobilised 
from development finance institutions. This will provide the fiscal space for emerging 
markets and developing countries to adopt sustained counter-cyclical responses to the 
crisis.
Countries share common but differentiated responsibilities in combating the climate crisis. 
Without large-scale debt relief and efforts aimed at facilitating a green and inclusive 
recovery, the international community can abandon its hopes of achieving the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement. The lives and livelihoods of current 
and future generations hang in the balance.
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1.  Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic strikes us at a time when – according to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change – we have about a decade left to achieve a low-carbon transition 
and bring the world economy onto the 1.5°C or «well below 2°C» trajectory agreed in the 
Paris Agreement (IPCC, 2018). The next few years are our last chance to avoid catastroph-
ic global warming. It is hence imperative that the various crisis response measures amount 
to a transformative policy response (Volz, 2020). Immediate crisis responses aimed at 
combating the virus and protecting jobs and firms in order to mount a recovery need to be 
aligned with our longer-term, strategic goals of mitigating climate change and engaging in 
climate change adaptation and resilience. Economic stimulus and recovery measures 
should strengthen the resilience of our economies and engineer a just transition. As was 
recently pointed out by Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF): This is the time «to revive or lose the Paris Agreement» (Georgieva, 
2020).
There is, however, a major problem: Many countries lack the means to finance a recovery 
and undertake critically needed investments in climate adaptation and mitigation. Al-
though developed countries have been able to respond forcefully to the crisis by using fiscal 
policy, loans and loan guarantees to businesses, and quantitative easing policies, the re-
sponses of developing countries have been on average much smaller (Figure 1). Covid-19 
triggered the worst recession of the global economy since the Second World War (World 










Developed countries Developing countries
Loans/loan guarantees to businessesFiscal Quantitative easing Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2020b)
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Bank, 2020a) and has dramatically worsened public finances, which in many countries 
were shaky already before the current crisis. According to the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF), global debt across all sectors had hit 320% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
in April of 2020, already 40 percentage points higher than at the onset of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. The crisis has also worsened the foreign exchange constraints facing many 
developing countries (UNCTAD, 2020a). This is further constraining public finances and 
the ability of governments to support their citizens and undertake crucial action in climate 
adaptation and mitigation. There has already been a surge in sovereign debt downgrades 
since April 2020, more than during any financial crisis since 1980 (Bulow et al., 2020). 
The debt distress resulting from Covid-19 threatens «another lost decade for climate 
action» (Estevão, 2020: 273).
Going forward, many countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis to 
safeguard lives and the wellbeing of people and undertake meaningful investment to cli-
mate-proof their economies. The Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), agreed by the 
Group of 20 (G20) in April 2020, merely provided breathing space, but it did not address 
the core problems: It did not involve private creditors, who hold large chunks of develop-
ing-country debt. Importantly, debt relief efforts have to include, but go beyond, low-in-
come countries. Many middle-income countries – which are not eligible for the DSSI – are 
heavily indebted and urgently need debt relief.
In November 2020, the G20 has rightly come to the realisation that debt suspension will 
not be adequate for a number of countries, and put forward a «Common Framework for 
Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI». This proposes a reduction in overall debt levels on a 
case by case basis for those DSSI countries deemed to have unsustainable debt. This move 
is yet another welcome step in the right direction by the G20 but falls short on three counts. 
First, there are a number of middle-income countries, including small island developing 
states, that may experience unsustainable debt that should be eligible for relief. For in-
stance, in the Caribbean, which is suffering from the pandemic, economic hardship, and 
hurricanes simultaneously, the levels of debt burden and service are in many cases already 
unbearable (ECLAC, 2020). Second, the G20's new framework still lacks a mechanism for 
meaningful private creditor involvement and fails to address the first-mover problem for 
participating nations. Third, the new framework lacks a commitment by creditors and 
debtor countries alike to align newfound fiscal space with globally shared climate and 
development goals.
This report puts forward the proposal for a «Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery 
Initiative» as an ambitious, concerted, and comprehensive debt relief initiative – to be 
adopted on a global scale – that frees up resources to support recoveries in a sustainable 
way, boosts economies’ resilience, and fosters a just transition to a low-carbon economy.
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The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the debt situation in 
countries of the Global South. Section 3 lays out the nexus between climate vulnerability 
and debt sustainability and explains why investments in a green recovery that facilitates a 
just transition are not only urgently needed at this juncture, but also the best economic 
policy. Section 4 presents our proposal for a new framework for a global and systemic 
response to the debt and climate crises. Section 5 discusses the crucial importance of 
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2. A Looming Debt Crisis
The Covid-19 crisis has dramatically worsened public finances across the globe. Public 
debt, which was already unsustainable in many developing countries before Covid-19, is 
increasing rapidly and constraining government responses to the health, social, and eco-
nomic crises caused by the pandemic. If not addressed, the debt crisis will also hold back 
recoveries and undermine the development prospects of hundreds of millions of people in 
the Global South. The World Bank estimates that the Covid-19 pandemic will push an 
additional 88 million to 115 million people into extreme poverty in 2020, with the total 
rising to as many as 150 million by 2021 (World Bank, 2020b).
The Covid-19 pandemic is precipitating a long-brewing debt crisis in the developing world, 
which risks delaying and weakening the recovery from the 2020 global recession.[1] When 
the Covid-19 pandemic hit, developing-country debt had already reached problematic 
levels. In 2019, their private and public external debt – the most unstable component of 
national debt and the hardest to manage – passed US$8 trillion (at current exchange 
rates), an increase of 125% since the global financial crisis. Of this, at least US$5.8 
trillion will be still outstanding in 2021 and 2022, requiring approximately US$1.2 trillion 
in principal and interest payments. The IMF (2020a) projects the sovereign debt-to-GDP 
ratio in advanced economies to rise by 20 percentage points – to about 125% of GDP by 
the end of 2021 – while emerging market and developing economies are projected to see an 
increase of more than 10 percentage points, to about 65% of GDP.
A sustainable recovery requires investing heavily in the transition away from fossil fuels, 
including in developing countries. Numerous studies – including the recent World Econom-
ic Outlook 2020 (IMF, 2020a) – demonstrate that a green recovery is not only environmen-
tally sensible, but also good economic policy that ensures the foundations for longer-term 
economic success and debt sustainability. But unless the debt crisis is met with appropriate 
instruments at the multilateral level, policymakers will be forced to delay or cancel those 
investments, especially in developing countries. The IMF (2020a) estimates that the ratio 
of public debt service costs to government tax revenue will exceed 30% in 29% of low-in-
come developing countries in 2020, and in 33% of these countries in 2021. Among emerg-
ing markets, 71% of countries face a ratio of public debt service costs to government tax 
revenue greater than 30% in 2020, and 73% in 2021. In other words, instead of being able 
to support their people to weather the crisis and invest in a sustainable recovery, govern-
ments are required to repay their creditors.
1 For background analysis of the worsening debt situation in the Global South, see Chelva and Capaldo 
(2020).






















































Source: Compiled with data from IMFʼs World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020











































































Source: Compiled with data from IMFʼs World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020
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Figure 2 shows the significant increase in government gross debt of sub-Saharan African 
countries as share of GDP over the last decade. According to IMF estimates, the total 
external debt service of sub-Saharan African countries as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services will reach similar levels in 2020 as during the mid-1990s (Figure 3), when the 
international community decided that it was time to deliver debt relief to heavily indebted 
countries.
For many developing countries, private lending has already frozen, making debt rollover 
impossible and raising the risk of a cascade of corporate and sovereign bankruptcies. As 
pointed out by the Group of Thirty, no sub-Saharan African country has borrowed in the 




















Debt Relief for a Green and Inclusive Recovery 20/ 58
3.  Debt Sustainability, Climate Vulnerability, 
  Opportunities for Climate Action, and the 
  Imperative of a Just Transition
Climate vulnerability threatens debt sustainability and 
increases the cost of capital
Climate change can have a material impact on sovereign risk through direct and indirect 
effects on public finances (Volz et al., 2020). Perversely, the impacts of climate change are 
the greatest in countries that contributed the least to anthropogenic global warming. For 
many climate-vulnerable countries, a rapid scaling-up of investment in climate resilience is 















































Source: Compiled with data from the IMFʼs International Debt 
Statistics Database and the Notre Dame Global Adaptation 
Initiativeʼs (ND-GAIN) vulnerability index (Chen et al., 2015) 
Fig. 4: Climate vulnerability vs foreign exchange debt-to-GDP ratio
The horizontal axis shows the ND-GAIN Vulnerability Index, while the vertical axis shows the FX debt to GDP ratio
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that are struggling the most to finance adaptation and resilience. They are often most 
impacted by climate-related macrofinancial risks, and both governments and corporates 
are now facing a climate risk premium on the cost of capital (Beirne et al., 2020; Buhr et 
al., 2018; Kling et al., 2020).
Low- and lower-middle-income economies show the highest propensity to be negatively 
impacted by climate hazards (Figure 4). As they now have often worrying public debt 
profiles, these economies are likely to face the economic and social costs of climate change 
while also grappling with the fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic. It should be noted that 
the debt-carrying capacities of poorer countries tend to be much lower than for richer 
countries.
Governments must climate-proof their economies and public finances or potentially face an 
ever-worsening spiral of climate vulnerability and unsustainable debt burdens (Volz et al., 
2020). There is a danger that vulnerable developing countries will enter a vicious circle in 
which greater climate vulnerability raises the cost of debt and diminishes the fiscal space 
for investment in climate resilience. As financial markets increasingly price climate risks, 
and global warming accelerates, the risk premia of these countries, which are already high, 
are likely to increase further. The impact of Covid-19 on public finances risks reinforcing 
this vicious circle. For instance, debt service in Caribbean countries, which are among the 
most climate-vulnerable in the world, currently absorbs between 30% and 70% of govern-
ment revenues (Bárcena, 2020), providing little room for supporting livelihoods during the 
crisis, not to speak of much-needed investments in climate resilience.
International support for increased investments in climate resilience and mechanisms to 
transfer financial risks is urgently needed and could help these countries enter a virtuous 
circle. Greater investments in resilience could reduce both vulnerability and the cost of 
debt, providing these countries with extra room to scale-up investments to tackle the 
climate challenge.
Building back better strengthens recoveries and long-
term growth prospects
Today, contrary to outdated economic wisdom, there is no trade-off between choosing a 
sustainable recovery and economic progress. Fiscal policy can be devised to simultaneously 
stabilise the economy and public finances while furthering sustainable development (Este-
vão, 2020). In its latest World Economic Outlook report from October 2020, the IMF 
(2020a, 93) highlights that «the goal of bringing net carbon emissions to zero by 2050 in 
each country can be achieved through a comprehensive policy package that is growth 
friendly (especially in the short term)».
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Many green technologies have matured, and low-carbon energy is in most cases cheaper 
now than fossil-fuel based energy (IEA, 2020; IRENA, 2020). Recent evidence suggests 
that green projects can generate more employment and deliver higher short-term returns 
per dollar spent, compared to conventional fiscal stimulus (Hepburn et al., 2020; Unsworth 
et al., 2020; We Mean Business, 2020). A new study by the We Mean Business coalition 
(2020) shows that the growth impact of a «return to normal» recovery that ignores sus-
tainability considerations is smaller than that of a «green» recovery plan that aims to boost 
economic activity while simultaneously reducing CO2 emissions. Moreover, while having 
the same cost for the government, the «green» recovery plan may also deliver long-term 
economic benefits. Conversely, a lack of public climate policy action, tighter financial 
constraints, and unfavourable economic conditions can have adverse effects on the environ-
mental performance of the private sector, reduce green investments, and slow down the 
transition to a low-carbon economy (Guerin et al., 2020).
Importantly, today’s investments in climate change mitigation and adaptation generate 
substantial long-term returns and cost savings, whereas the cost of inaction or late action 
on climate change is high. Actions taken now to mitigate climate change represent an 
investment that will generate dividends into the future, whereas continued inaction will 
give way to disastrous global warming with much higher costs down the line. Equally, 
failing to invest in making economies and societies more climate-resilient undermines 
future growth and wellbeing. The Global Commission on Adaptation calculated that for 
every US$1 invested in building climate resilience, this could result in between US$2 and 
US$10 in net economic benefits (GCA, 2019). Likewise, investing in the conservation, 
sustainable use, and restoration of biodiversity can provide jobs, business opportunities, 
and other benefits to society (OECD, 2020).
Yet, as investments in mitigation and adaptation tend to be more capital-intensive than 
business as usual, the financing of mitigation and adaptation measures may become more 
challenging with a worsening debt situation and increasing cost of capital. Due to fiscal 
constraints, they may be postponed further «until the crisis is over». This would be a huge 
mistake, as the damage to the global economy caused by each additional ton of fossil 
carbon exceeds its contribution to growth. The dramatic fall in the cost of renewable energy 
provides an opportunity to make a big push for investment in zero-carbon energy infra-
structure, addressing problems of energy poverty, and enabling sustainable growth.
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Box 1: Renewable energy investment for a just transition – 
a case study from South Africa
South Africa’s economy, already precarious before Covid-2019, has been tipped into a 
full-blown crisis by the pandemic. Gross national government debt, at 63.5% of GDP 
in FY 2019/20, is expected to rise to 86% within two years. Eskom, the country’s 
state-owned monopolistic and vertically integrated electricity utility, is a key driver of 
this escalating debt profile, and it lies at the heart of the economy’s structural chal-
lenges.
Eskom faces unprecedented financial, operational, and technological challenges, 
including: a failing coal fleet (which generates 85% of its electricity); a carbon and 
local pollutant profile that is rapidly becoming intolerable to society; an outdated 
sector model; constraining policy and regulatory environments; revenue shortfalls and 
the early stages of a utility death spiral; together with a ballooning debt burden of 
R480 billion (US$27.9bn). A total of 77.2% of this debt is government-guaranteed, 
and a significant portion is stranded and cannot be serviced.  Over the next three 
years, Eskom’s projected debt maturity profile totals R224 billion (US$13bn), but 
accessing funding to refinance maturing debt is increasingly difficult. South Africa’s 
National Treasury has committed to a 10-year bailout programme totalling R230 
billion (US$13.4bn) to assist. If this is removed due to the fiscal unfeasibility, Eskom’s 
debt will become immediately unserviceable. As shareholder and guarantor, Eskom’s 
risk profile is automatically transferred to the sovereign, impacting the sovereign 
credit rating and increasing South Africa’s borrowing costs.
At the same time, South Africa has a significant and immediate opportunity to pivot 
its carbon-intensive power sector towards low-carbon energy. Comprehensive model-
ling by Meridian Economics and the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR, 2020; Roff et al., 2020) finds that system cost is no longer a barrier to de-
creasing the carbon emissions of South Africa’s electricity system by up to 1.5 giga-
tonnes (Gt) through an ambitious renewables rollout system.
A strategically managed, ambitious renewables rollout will trigger large-scale green 
industrialisation, providing a sustainable economic stimulus for South Africa’s ailing 
economy. Although such a build programme is commercially financeable given the 
country’s superior renewables resources and mature financing sector, the lack of a 
credible and clear vision and policy commitment for the electricity sector – together 
with a stable market and system operator (product of an unbundled Eskom) – are 
constraining the realisation of this opportunity.
An important political aspect of the South African electricity crisis is the need for a 
just transition away from coal. Most of South Africa’s coal mining and power-related
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activities are concentrated in the Mpumalanga Province, which hosts 12 of Eskom’s 
15 power stations and a large share of the country’s coal mines. This has a severe 
impact on air quality and the health of local populations, but a transition from coal 
will result in significant disruption in Mpumalanga, with livelihoods at stake. There is 
a need to support the retraining and retiring of the coal workforce, together with the 
creation of alternative employment opportunities in the Mpumalanga area. An ambi-
tious rollout of renewables would create the foundation for this just transition. Target-
ed localisation of renewable energy industrial activities and a portion of renewable 
energy build can feasibly be managed for Mpumalanga, supporting the absorption of 
workers from the declining coal industry and stimulating opportunities in value chain 
activities related to a new, greener local economy. In addition, a just transition en-
hances the local environmental and health benefits of phasing out coal-fired power.
A combination of debt relief and new transition finance to stabilise the economic and 
financial situation could be combined with an agreement on creating the necessary 
policies and regulatory environment for the realisation of such an ambitious proposal.
Source: Based on Tyler et al. (2020)
Fig. 5: Renewable energy build scenario to achieve coal phase down by 2040
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Phasing out fossil fuels and reducing the exposure to 
stranded assets
Recognising that countries need to have common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, the fossil fuel industry will have to go into managed decline in order 
to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Research has documented the gap between the 
carbon budget that can be spent and the estimated cap needed on CO2 emissions to limit 
global warming to 2°C, or even 1.5°C relative to preindustrial levels (Carbon Tracker, 
2011, 2020; UNEP, 2019). The Production Gap Report 2019 of the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) – an assessment of the gap between the targets of the Paris Agree-
ment and countries’ planned production of coal, oil, and gas – found that «governments 
already are planning to produce about 50% more fossil fuels by 2030 than would be con-
sistent with a 2°C pathway and 120% more than would be consistent with a 1.5°C path-
way» (SEI et al., 2019). The forced decline of fossil fuel emissions is accelerated by 
technological change, as fossil fuels are increasingly undercut by cheaper renewables and 
better storage.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the pandemic has led to lower prices 
and downward revisions to demand that have reduced the value of future oil and gas pro-
duction by a quarter (IEA, 2020). As a consequence, many oil- and gas-producing coun-
tries are now «facing acute fiscal pressures as a result of high reliance on hydrocarbon 
revenues» (IEA, 2020: 20). Fossil fuel development is an increasingly risky proposition, 
and fossil fuels are increasingly recognised as potentially stranded assets. The IEA argues 
therefore that «[n]ow, more than ever, fundamental efforts to diversify and reform the 
economies of some major oil and gas exporters look unavoidable» (IEA, 2020: 20).
In such an environment, it would be foolish to pursue high risk investments in fossil fuel 
extraction and infrastructure as part of a recovery strategy. Yet, debt servicing require-
ments may push countries to pursue export revenue at any cost, including by exacerbating 
resource extraction – both fossil and other natural resources – in conflict with the goals of 
the Paris Agreement. Some countries such as Ecuador have even entered into loan agree-
ments with creditors backed by future oil revenues. As previously discussed, in many 
low-income and lower-middle-income countries, the ratio of foreign currency debt over 
GDP is dangerously high. This constrains the fiscal space and puts heavy pressure on 
governments to cut investment and monetise natural resources.
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Box 2:Compensating indebted governments for leaving oil and 
gas in the ground
Effective climate action requires leaving vast amounts of fossil fuels in the ground. 
Yet, as shown in the Production Gap Report 2019 (SEI et al., 2019), countries across 
the world are planning a continued expansion of fossil fuel production. 
Although fossil fuel development, in particular oil and gas, promised vast riches in the 
past, today it is exposing fossil fuel producers and their creditors to a massive strand-
ed asset risk. This is particularly true for new, hitherto unexploited reserves, which on 
average require 10 years and massive upfront investment in infrastructure (pipelines, 
terminal) before the first oil flows.
Nevertheless, the pressing needs of servicing debt and the prevailing mindset of asso-
ciating fossil fuels with wealth may still push new producer countries into subsidising 
fossil fuel development and entering into risky contracts with oil and gas firms.
In an innovative proposal, West (2020) proposes a contract between international 
creditors and governments to leave certain oil and gas reserves in the ground, for an 
initial 10-year period. In exchange, a participating government would receive debt 
relief corresponding to a signature bonus and a series of annual payments. The amount 
could be calculated based on traditional oil industry methods of asset evaluation, 
applying them to future revenue profiles of governments with potential oil and gas 
projects.
The mechanism would allow for an opt-in at the level of individual oil and gas fields. 
Such an approach globally could prevent up to 400 Gt of CO2 emissions at a cost 
varying between US$2 and US$10 per tonne, just among the so-called new producer 
countries. This is equivalent to roughly 13 times the annual emissions from fossil fuels.
The imperative of a globally just transition
The coronavirus has ruptured our world and, as with past global pandemics, raised funda-
mental questions about the way we organise society and the values that structure our lives. 
In our highly interdependent and increasingly fragile world, the measure of success cannot 
just be whether we ward off another financial crisis and avoid increased public debt. Suc-
ceeding generations will not applaud higher share prices or fuller treasuries if we fail to 
meet the challenge of turning a better recovery into a just transition to a fairer and more 
sustainable world. 
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Now is the time to hammer out a plan for global recovery, one that can push even the most 
vulnerable countries into a stronger position than before the crisis, and at the same time 
reverse course towards planetary destruction. 
It is therefore crucial that the recovery be green, economically inclusive, and socially just. 
Indeed, it is evident that a transition to an environmentally sustainable economy can only 
be successful if it is inclusive and in line with social development. The Paris Agreement has 
therefore acknowledged «the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the 
creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development 
priorities» (UN, 2015).[2] Private markets will not deliver these outcomes on their own. 
Achieving these goals requires putting sustained investment in public goods, public invest-
ment, and public policy at the centre of the recovery agenda.
With the proper fiscal and policy space, a green recovery can better support demand in the 
short term and create more jobs. While generating higher growth and making us less prone 
to climate and other shocks, a green recovery can therefore enhance debt sustainability and 
is in the common interest of both borrowers and creditors. Moreover, because the effects of 
environmental change disproportionately harm the vulnerable, enabling all countries to 
scale-up public climate action and protect the environment can ensure a marriage of 
climate and social justice.
At a time when lives and livelihoods are threatened in countries around the world (UNDP, 
2020), the immediate focus of governments needs to be providing income and social sup-
port to their citizens – particularly the most vulnerable in society – and bolstering health 
systems under severe stress. Covid-19 has disproportionately affected the poor, especially 
in countries where access to health care is not assured (Stiglitz, 2020). UNDP estimates 
global human development – as a combined measure of the world’s education, health, and 
living standards – will decline in 2020 for the first time since the concept was developed in 
1990. According to the World Bank, as many as 155 million people will be pushed into 
extreme poverty due to Covid-19 by the end of 2021 – with eight out of ten of those people 
in middle-income countries (World Bank, 2020b).
The world’s largest economies have quickly adopted relief packages, in the order of US$13 
trillion, to support corporate payroll, mitigate the damage to households from locking 
down, and increase the response capacity of hospitals. Whether these packages will evolve 
into the long-term support necessary for a just transition remains to be seen. However, 
these same governments have, so far, been unwilling to extend a helping hand to developing 
2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states that «Parties should protect the 
climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities» 
(UNFCCC, 1997: §3.1).
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countries, where a combination of precarious work conditions, deep debt distress, and 
insufficient fiscal and policy space have amplified the economic damage from the Covid-19 
shock. This was not the response envisaged 75 years ago by those who created the multilat-
eral system.
Achieving global social justice in an interdependent world was a central goal of President 
Roosevelt’s original New Deal in response to the economic carnage and political polarisa-
tion triggered by the Great Depression. Achieving that goal required a multilateral re-
sponse: «Economic diseases are highly communicable,» Roosevelt said at the opening of 
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, «[i]t follows, therefore, that the economic health 
of every country is a proper matter of concern to all its neighbors, near and distant. Only 
through a dynamic and a soundly expanding world economy can the living standards of 
individual nations be advanced to levels which will permit a full realization of our hopes for 
the future» (Roosevelt, 1944).
Despite those hopes now hanging in the balance in many developing countries, the inability 
of the international community to put forward comprehensive proposals to alleviate debt 
distress, institute reliable last-resort lending, and agree on an equitable distribution of any 
future vaccine are signs that revitalising multilateralism must be an urgent priority if we 
are to recover better from this crisis.
Alongside the debt relief outlined in this proposal, in the short run and to alleviate immedi-
ate balance of payment pressures, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) should be expanded 
through a reallocation of unused SDRs in developed economies to developing countries, as 
well as through a sizable, fresh allocation.
The concessional lending capacity of multilateral development banks will also have to be 
boosted and mobilised in record time. International institutions will also have to bolster 
domestic tax regimes and close global loopholes so that revenues can be properly mobi-
lised. At the same time, these institutions should reassess their policy conditionalities so 
that they are brought more into line with a more sustainable and inclusive development 
agenda.
A debt relief effort of the appropriate scale – if coupled with a new and ambitious alloca-
tion of SDRs and significant new capital mobilised from development finance institutions 
– will provide the fiscal space for emerging markets and developing countries to adopt 
sustained counter-cyclical responses to the crisis. In order to achieve a just transition, large 
and sustained increases in public investment will be necessary.
All nations share common but differentiated responsibilities in combating the climate crisis 
and should adapt these goals to their country-specific circumstances. In general, stepwise 
investments in sustainable infrastructure and targeted support of key industries will be 
essential to the transition, alongside investments in people and innovation to ensure that 
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such a transition generates full employment, decent work, and opportunities for new eco-
nomic activity. International institutions; multilateral and bilateral trade and investment 
treaties; national governments; and businesses must align to these transitions while making 
sure that countries, sectors, and communities disproportionately impacted by these chang-
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4.  A New Framework for a Global and 
  Systemic Response to the Debt and 
  Climate Crises
To enable a green and socially just recovery for all countries, public debt problems need to 
be urgently addressed so that all governments have the fiscal space to finance crucial 
health and social spending and invest in a green and inclusive recovery. We are facing an 
unprecedented challenge in the Global South that requires bold action. A systemic crisis 
needs systemic answers. We need a new framework that will provide debt relief to countries 
that require it, while ensuring that the relief is calibrated towards attacking the virus, 
protecting the vulnerable, and staging a green and inclusive economy.
Important proposals have been made for addressing the debt problem (Berensmann et al., 
2020; Bolton et al., 2020), including innovative proposals for debt swaps to alleviate debt, 
enhance climate action, and prevent further nature loss (Khan, 2020; Leonard et al., 2020; 
Picolotti et al., 2020; Steele and Patel, 2020), as well as proposals for «nature perfor-
mance bonds» (F4BI, 2020a, 2020b).
Reforms that align policies and budgets with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development & the Paris Agreement
Brady-type credit enhancement to facilitate access to capital markets
Pillar 1




with creditors swapping their 
old debt with a haircut for new 
«Green Recovery Bonds»
Pillar 3
Facilitating a green and 
inclusive recovery through 
debt swaps and new 
SDG-aligned debt instruments
Heavily indebted countries with an unsustainable debt burden Countries that are not
heavily indebted
Enhanced Debt Sustainability Analysis
Fig. 6: Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery
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Building on these proposals, we propose a Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery Initia-
tive as an ambitious, concerted, and comprehensive debt relief initiative – to be adopted on a 
global scale – that frees up resources to support recoveries in a sustainable way, boosts econo-
mies’ resilience, and fosters a just transition to a low-carbon economy.[3] Our proposal consists 
of three pillars and aims at achieving maximum creditor and debtor participation (Figure 6).
Pillar 1: Comprehensive debt relief for eligible heavily 
  indebted countries by public creditors
Under Pillar 1, comprehensive and significant debt relief would be granted to eligible 
heavily indebted countries with an unsustainable debt burden by public creditors – analo-
gous to, but improving upon, the HIPC Initiative / Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) model (Box 3).[4] The indebted countries would receive significant debt relief on 
their bilateral and – under certain conditions – also multilateral debt in order to provide 
the fiscal space for investment in health and social spending to fight the pandemic and in 
climate adaptation. Governments receiving debt relief would need to commit to reforms 
that align their policies and budgets with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and the Paris Agreement. 
Eligibility should go beyond the world’s 74 poorest countries that are eligible to borrow 
from the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA), as was the case with the 
HIPC Initiative. Eligibility should be a function of debt sustainability, which should be 
determined in a Debt Sustainability Assessment carried out by the IMF and the World 
Bank, with inputs from other institutions. Debt Sustainability Assessments need to be 
based on realistic assumptions and account for climate risks (Guzman and Heymann, 
2015; Volz and Ahmed, 2020). If a Debt Sustainability Assessment asserts that the sover-
eign debt of a country is of significant concern, the G20 should coordinate with all bilateral 
and multilateral creditors about a debt restructuring, and the IMF should make its 
3  Some ideas for this proposal build on Viterbo et al. (2020).
4 It will be important to learn lessons from the HIPC Initiative. See, for instance, de Bruijn and Rehbein 
(2011), Biti et al. (2016), and Caliari (2020).
Debt Relief for a Green and Inclusive Recovery 33/ 58
programmes conditional on a sovereign debt restructuring involving private creditors.[5] 
Debtor countries that seek bilateral haircuts will be required to seek commensurate relief 
from private creditors, and incentives need to be designed to ensure that private creditors 
grant such relief. Lending by multilateral development banks and humanitarian assistance 
will continue to flow, but on condition that it is not used to pay private creditors. Pri-
vate-sector involvement will be treated under Pillar 2, details of which are discussed below. 
It is crucial that a restructuring of publicly held debt proceeds only under conditions of 
equal treatment of private creditors.
Debt owed by multilateral institutions would only be restructured for IDA-eligible countries. To 
safeguard the preferred creditor status of multilateral institutions, their losses would need to be 
financed by bilateral contributions, the proceeds from gold sales, or the issuance of new SDRs.
As mentioned, countries receiving debt relief would need to commit to using a significant 
portion of the freed-up resources from reduced debt service to finance a green and inclusive 
recovery and aligning their policies and budgets with the goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement. Commitments to align policies and 
budgets with the SDGs and the Paris goals would be monitored by a new, inter-institutional 
steering committee. In line with Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement, which calls for the 
alignment of financial flows with the aims of the agreement, participating countries would 
need to commit to nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that are in line with the 
«well below 2°C» trajectory and develop a credible long-term strategy to achieve this.[6] 
Development partners would need to provide capacity-building and financing support to 
enable implementation. It needs to be highlighted that aligning public finances with the 
goals of the Paris Agreement does not imply that large proportions of public finances need 
to be dedicated to climate action.[7]
5 In a recent policy paper, the IMF (2020e) noted: «The conditions under which the IMF may lend to 
countries whose debt is deemed unsustainable on a forward-looking basis can create incentives for 
sovereign debtors and their creditors to engage in orderly and speedy debt restructurings. If a sover-
eign’s debt is deemed unsustainable, the IMF is precluded from lending unless the member is taking 
steps to restore debt sustainability. Post-default, the IMF’s Lending into Arrears policy (LIA) ensures 
that the IMF lends into arrears only if (i) prompt IMF support is considered essential for the imple-
mentation of the member’s adjustment program and (ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies 
and is making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors. Pre-default, 
the IMF requires assurances that a credible process is in train that the debt restructuring will be 
successful in restoring debt sustainability consistent with the IMF-supported program.» The IMF has 
announced a review of its practices and policies in both areas in 2021.
6 Article 2.1c calls on countries to «[make] finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development».
7 Abstaining from subsidising fossil energies and creating an enabling environment for private invest-
ment in clean technologies and renewable energies will go a long way to transform economies, given 
that their costs have come down dramatically and are in most cases cheaper than conventional energy 
sources (IEA, 2020; IRENA, 2020).
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Box 3: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative[8]
Debt relief key to poverty reduction
The HIPC Initiative was launched in 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank, with the 
aim of ensuring that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage. Since 
then, the international financial community, including multilateral organisations and 
governments, have worked together to lower to sustainable levels the external debt 
burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries.
In 1999, a comprehensive review of the initiative allowed the IMF to provide faster, 
deeper, and broader debt relief and strengthened the links between debt relief, poverty 
reduction, and social policies.
In 2005, to help accelerate progress towards the United Nations Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, the HIPC Initiative was supplemented by the MDRI. The MDRI allows for 
100% relief on eligible debts by three multilateral institutions – the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the African Development Fund – for countries completing the HIPC Initia-
tive process. In 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank also decided to provide 
additional («beyond HIPC») debt relief to the five HIPCs in the Western Hemisphere.
Two-step process
Countries must meet certain criteria, commit to poverty reduction through policy 
changes, and demonstrate a good track record over time. The IMF and the World 
Bank provide interim debt relief in the initial stage and, when a country meets its 
commitments, full debt relief is provided.
First step: decision point. To be considered for HIPC Initiative assistance, a country 
must fulfil the following four conditions:
1) be eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s IDA, which provides interest-free 
loans and grants to the world’s poorest countries, and from the IMF’s Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust, which provides loans to low-income countries at 
subsidised rates;
2) be facing an unsustainable debt burden that cannot be addressed through traditional 
debt relief mechanisms;
3) have established a track record of reform and sound policies through programmes 
supported by the IMF and the World Bank; and
8 For a review of experiences with HIPC, see Caliari (2020).
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4) have developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through a broad-based 
participatory process in the country.
Once a country has met or made sufficient progress in meeting these four criteria, the 
Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank formally decide on its eligibility for 
debt relief, and the international community commits to reducing debt to a level that is 
considered sustainable. This first stage under the HIPC Initiative is referred to as the 
decision point. Once a country reaches its decision point, it may immediately begin 
receiving interim relief on its debt service falling due.
Second step: completion point. In order to receive a full and irrevocable reduction in 
debt available under the HIPC Initiative, a country must:
1) establish a further track record of good performance under programmes supported 
by loans from the IMF and the World Bank;
2) implement satisfactorily key reforms agreed at the decision point; and
3) adopt and implement its PRSP for at least one year.
Once a country has met these criteria, it can reach its completion point, which allows 
it to receive the full debt relief committed at the decision point.
Countries receiving debt relief. Of the 39 countries eligible or potentially eligible for 
HIPC Initiative assistance, 36 are receiving full debt relief from the IMF and other 
creditors after reaching their completion points. Three countries that have been 
identified as potentially eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance have not yet reached 
their decision points, but Somalia is making progress towards achieving this milestone 
in the coming months. 
Debt relief frees up resources for social spending
Debt relief is one part of a much larger effort, which also includes aid flows to address 
the development needs of low-income countries and ensure that debt sustainability is 
maintained over time. For debt reduction to have a tangible impact on poverty, the 
additional money needs to be spent on programmes that benefit the poor.
Boosting social spending. Before the HIPC Initiative, eligible countries were, on aver-
age, spending slightly more on debt service than on health and education combined. 
Now, they have increased markedly their expenditures on health, education, and other 
social services. On average, such spending is about five times the amount of debt-ser-
vice payments.
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Reducing debt service. For the 36 countries receiving debt relief, debt service paid has 
declined by about 1.5 percentage points of GDP between 2001 and 2015. More re-
cently, with the increase in public debt in low-income countries, debt service burdens 
have started to rise, although they still remain 1 percentage point below the pre-HIPC 
levels of 2017.
Improving public debt management. Debt relief has markedly improved the debt posi-
tions of post–completion point countries, bringing their debt indicators down below 
those of other HIPCs or non-HIPCs. However, many remain vulnerable to shocks, 
particularly those that affect exports, as seen during the global economic crisis. To 
reverse the recent increase in low-income country public debt burdens and reduce 
their debt vulnerabilities, countries need to pursue cautious borrowing policies and 
strengthen their public debt management.
Source: Adapted from IMF (2020b)
Pillar 2: Private-sector involvement
The lackluster success of the HIPC Initiative shows clearly that compulsory participation 
will be necessary from not only official creditors, but the private sector alike. To secure 
private-sector participation, it will be crucial to involve the IMF (Hagan, 2020) and other 
multilateral institutions. As discussed under Pillar 1, if a Debt Sustainability Assessment 
asserts that the public debt of a country is of significant concern, the IMF should make its 
programmes conditional on a sovereign debt restructuring involving private creditors, and 
debtor countries seeking bilateral haircuts will be required to seek commensurate relief 
from private creditors. Such a commitment by public lenders should induce private credi-
tors to participate in and contribute to a debt restructuring process which provides fiscal 
space to governments to invest in quality and inclusive growth.[9] Section 5 discusses the 
issue of private-sector involvement in greater detail.
9 Hagan (2020: 8) explains the rationale for involving the IMF as follows: «If […] implementation of 
the debt standstill is made a condition for the use of IMF resources, the incentives change and improve 
the chances of implementation. For a sovereign, it will now be a choice between agreeing to approach 
its private creditors for a standstill or being unable to obtain IMF resources to continue to service its 
debt obligations, resulting in a possible default. For private creditors, the choices also change: if they 
fail to agree to a standstill, they know that the program approved by the IMF will not provide for 
payments to be made to them during the standstill period, which will result in a default and applica-
tion of the IMF’s [lending-into-arrears] policy. While implementation of the standstill in these 
circumstances may still adversely affect the country’s credit rating, the stigma may not be as great: 
because it is a condition for the availability of IMF resources, the country will not suffer the stigma of 
being seen as «choosing» to avail itself of the standstill.»
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Under Pillar 2, the same group of eligible countries as under Pillar 1 would be granted 
debt relief by private creditors. As a minimum, private creditor debt relief has to comply at 
least with comparability of treatment, as stipulated by the Paris Club of official creditors. 
Private creditors participating in the debt restructuring would swap their old debt holdings 
with a haircut for new «Green Recovery Bonds». As in the case of the restructuring of 
publicly held debt under Pillar 1, a significant portion of the reduced debt service burden 
from the debt relief by private creditors should be used by the debtor government for 
spending on a green and inclusive recovery (hence the name «Green Recovery Bonds»), and 
countries should commit to aligning their policies and public budgets with the goals of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement. Spending will be 
monitored by the same inter-institutional steering committee that monitors the implemen-
tation of Pillar 1 to ensure that spending is aligned with areas that enhance the achieve-
ment of the SDGs. The inter-institutional steering committee should involve public and 
private creditors, the United Nations, as well as civil society representatives.
Any new debt issued by countries participating in debt restructuring could receive Brady-
type credit enhancement – suitably adapted to current circumstances – in exchange for a 
commitment to dedicate receipts to SDG-aligned spending items.[10] Various proposals 
have been made for principles that could be used for financing a green and inclusive recov-
ery and drawn upon to develop an operational taxonomy (e.g. CPI et al., forthcoming; 
Philipponnat, 2020; TEG, 2020; World Bank, 2020c). The use of proceeds would be 
observed by the same monitoring mechanism as in the case of the restructured debt. The 
credit enhancement could be secured through an issuance of bonds by a multilateral institu-
tion with a triple-A rating or SDRs issued by the IMF.[11] In case of missed payments, the 
collateral would be released and could be liquidated by the private creditor. The missed 
payment would have to be repaid by the sovereign to the guarantor. Such a credit enhance-
ment mechanism would help countries that are undergoing debt restructuring under the 
Debt Relief for Green and Inclusive Recovery Initiative to continue to have access to inter-
national capital markets. At the same time, it would safeguard that the proceeds of any 
new borrowing are used for purposes that contribute to sustainable – that is, green and 
inclusive – economic development, which will also contribute to future debt sustainability.
10 Brady bonds were bonds collateralised by US Treasury bonds issued as a solution during the Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s.
11 There could be a menu of options (as there was in the original Brady Plan) to cater for creditors’ 
different needs and preferences. Creditors could choose between a haircut of principal, or lower 
interest, or bigger cuts with the offsetting sweetener of partial AAA collateral.
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Pillar 3: Facilitating a green recovery in countries that 
  are not heavily indebted through debt swaps 
  and new SDG-aligned debt instruments
Under Pillar 3, we envisage debt-for-climate or debt-for-sustainability swaps for countries 
that are not heavily indebted, but have reduced fiscal space due to Covid-19. For these, 
such swaps would facilitate raising climate ambitions in the form of additional actions or 
investments in climate adaptation or mitigation. Debt swaps under this pillar would be 
voluntary and not conducted as a distressed debt exchange. In other words, existing credi-
tors can decide not to participate in the debt-for-nature swap offer without having to fear 
that the alternative to accepting the swap would be a default. Therefore, most swaps would 
probably be transacted with official – mostly bilateral – creditors, or commercial financial 
debt bought by non-profit organisations at a discount in the secondary market.[12]
To raise climate ambitions, this could be complemented by an incentive scheme for the 
issuance of (new) sustainability-aligned sovereign debt (F4BI, 2020a, 2020b; Robins, 
2020). Again, an option would be a Brady-type credit enhancement in exchange for a 
commitment to Paris-aligned NDCs and to dedicate receipts to SDG-linked spending items, 
to be observed by the same monitoring mechanism as in the case of the restructured debt. 
As before, the credit enhancement could be secured by an issuance of bonds by a multilater-
al institution with a triple-A rating or SDRs issued by the IMF. Such a mechanism could 
incentivise governments to raise their NDC commitments while benefiting from lower 
refinancing costs.
12 See, for instance, World Ocean Initiative (2020).
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5.  How to Ensure Private-sector 
  Involvement?
No private-sector involvement in the Debt Service 
Suspension Initiative to date
When the G20 leaders decided in mid-April 2020 to temporarily suspend bilateral debt 
service payments for the worlds’ poorest countries, it called upon private creditors (such as 
asset managers and banks) to participate in the DSSI on comparable terms. Since then, 
the private creditors have engaged in the dialogue through the IIF. Under the IIF’s auspic-
es, creditors have agreed on general terms of reference for voluntary private-sector partici-
pation. But so far, no private creditor debt service has been suspended. The principal 
reason for this is that, to date, no debtor government has requested private-sector involve-
ment. Some borrowers have indicated concerns that application for DSSI participation 
might send a negative signal about their creditworthiness and lead to a sovereign default 
and prolonged exclusion from capital markets. 
Commercial creditors have reiterated market access risk repeatedly, which may have 
contributed to dissuading borrowers to ask for private-sector involvement. These fears are 
exaggerated. For several reasons, a potential loss of market access may not be as likely or 
severe as private creditors insinuate (Box 4). 
Some borrowing countries may also have, quite reasonably, concluded that the negative 
repercussions of requesting the rescheduling of commercial debt (such as a default being 
declared by rating agencies) are not worth the limited benefits of pushing out commercial 
debt service payments by only a few months. After all, the DSSI was originally set up to 
end by 2020. In October 2020 it was extended by another six months until mid-2021. 
Such short time frames skew the cost-benefit analysis of debtor countries against request-
ing private-sector involvement: The cost is fixed (perceived reputational damage hampering 
market access after reprofiling and the likely declaration of technical default), irrespective 
of the length of liquidity relief. By setting such short periods for DSSI liquidity relief, the 
G20 effectively made private-sector participation less likely.
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Box 4: Private-sector involvement and sovereign defaults
Debtor nations’ fears of defaults are overdone
When the leaders of the G20 countries decided in April 2020 to temporarily suspend 
bilateral debt service payments for the world’s poorest countries, they called upon 
private creditors to publicly participate in the initiative on comparable terms (G20, 
2020). However, private-sector creditors keep sitting on the fence, partly because 
debtor governments have so far refrained from requesting private-sector involvement 
(PSI). There are two reasons for this inaction: Firstly, there is concern about a default 
being formally declared on a country asking for PSI; secondly, the fear of losing 
capital market access for a prolonged period. Are these worries warranted? In short, 
the answers are «yes» and «probably not».
Private-sector debt suspension would be a default
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have two roles: provide independent opinions on relative 
creditworthiness of borrowers and declare a default in case of non-payment. A missed 
debt service payment to a private creditor, however small, would count as an outright 
default. This is not controversial. More nuanced is the case of a so-called distressed 
debt exchange (DDE). In this case, a default does not require a missed payment. A 
DDE is a situation in which the issuer offers bondholders a new package of securities 
that amounts to a diminished financial obligation, or where the exchange has the 
apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default (Moody’s, 2002). CRAs do not 
formally apply a net present value (NPV) calculation when determining whether a 
material reduction of the terms has occurred. Therefore, suspending debt service now 
and recovering it in the future in an NPV-neutral way could still be considered a 
default. A reduction in either face value, interest rate, or a maturity extension would 
usually suffice to declare default.
The second test for a DDE is a little more complex: How to determine whether a debt 
exchange is put forward with the purpose of averting an otherwise impending default? 
After all, opportunistically offering creditors to swap existing bonds for new ones is 
standard debt management practice. CRAs can use the existing rating as a proxy 
when assessing whether an exchange is distressed, and therefore tantamount to a 
default. S&P Global, for example, would ordinarily consider an exchange offer as 
distressed if the borrower carries a rating in the «B» category or bonds trade at a 
significant discount.
Finally, the declaration of default because of the execution of a DDE does not depend 
on whether creditors agree to the restructuring. Creditor participation in a DDE is 
«voluntary» only as far as the most likely alternative; an outright payment default 
would be even less attractive. What matters is the fact that the obligation is not being 
fulfilled as originally promised (S&P Global, 2020).
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All things considered, there seems to be no possible way for governments to ask for 
private creditor forbearance without being put into default. In fact, some DSSI-eligi-
ble countries have already been placed on a review for a downgrade because of the 
rising risk that commercial creditors will incur losses (e.g. Moody’s, 2020). Any PSI is 
highly likely to lead to a default by the sovereign requesting it. Which leads us to the 
second question: How damaging will the defaults be for future market access?
Market access is likely to be restored quickly
The drop in global interest rates, and the concomitant hunt for yield, has coincided 
with a shortening of the time it takes defaulting sovereigns to regain market access. 
For sovereign restructuring between 2000 and 2005, some market access was re-
gained after an average of 1.8 years. The equivalent loss of access was 4.4 years for 
sovereigns restructuring during the 1990s.[13] Therefore, past prolonged market 
exclusion episodes are a poor guide for our exceptional times.
13 This calculation is based on the database by Cruces and Trebesch (2013), with 11 episodes for the 
period 2000–2005 and 40 episodes for the period 1990–1999.
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Market access is likely to be restored more swiftly if a restructuring comes quickly and 
orderly. The longer governments hesitate, the deeper the haircuts will need to be and 
the longer the debt market exclusion will last. Empirical evidence illustrates that a 
pre-emptive and comprehensive restructuring of sovereign debt can soften the reces-
sion in the debtor country (Forni et al., 2016). Avoiding a deeper recession by restruc-
turing early also leads to better outcomes for creditors. Delays and repetitive 
restructurings have led in the past to larger haircuts (Forni et al., 2016). Evidence 
from sovereign default episodes suggests that a deeper haircut in turn leads to a 
longer loss of market access. Following restructurings with haircuts below 30%, there 
was a 50% probability of overcoming market exclusion within one to two years. On the 
other hand, in cases where the haircut was over 60%, it has historically taken more 
than a decade to get to this stage (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013). Procrastination is a 
lose-lose proposition: The ultimate financial loss for creditors will grow, while borrow-
ing countries’ recessions are deeper and longer, and their loss of market access more 
prolonged.
 
Yet, the sands are shifting. The perception is gaining ground that this crisis is more than a 
mere liquidity crisis. For several sovereigns, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, this is 
increasingly becoming a solvency crisis, as debt service burdens overwhelm the nations’ 
public finances. Some sovereigns, such as Zambia, were in an outright solvency crisis 
already before the pandemic struck. Credit Rating Agencies, which assess degrees of credit-
worthiness and solvency, have been consistently downgrading sub-Saharan African coun-
tries for years (Figure 8). For example, S&P Global lowered the GDP-weighted average 
rating of sub-Saharan sovereigns from «BB» in 2013 by over two notches to below «B+». 
The unweighted sub-Saharan average fell in lockstep to an even lower «B» rating (S&P 
Global, 2019). Already before the crisis, some sub-Saharan African sovereign bonds traded 
Fig. 8: Sub-Sahara Africa Rating History, December 2008 – October 2020
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at interest rate levels signalling elevated default risk. In February 2020, the IMF found 
half of all low-income economies to be at high risk of debt distress or already in debt 
distress (IMF, 2020c). That a shock of the magnitude of the Covid-19 crisis should push 
additional countries towards unsustainable debt burdens should therefore not come as a 
surprise.
It is encouraging that private creditors seem to progressively subscribe to the same 
more-realistic assessment of the situation. The IIF sent a letter to G20 leaders in late 
September, acknowledging that «the issues in some countries are no longer temporary 
liquidity problems, but rather more fundamental solvency concerns» (IIF, 2020).
How to overcome the collective action problem?
Although private-sector recognition of a solvency crisis is a necessary condition for debt 
relief, it is not a sufficient one. Most holders of sovereign bonds issued by DSSI-eligible 
countries are fund managers that invest others’ savings. They play a fiduciary role, as the 
funds they manage are not their own resources, but monies entrusted to them by third 
parties. The asset managers are the «agents» of the ultimate owners of the funds, the 
«principal». The Emerging Markets Investors Alliance, an association of asset managers 
involved in emerging markets, openly expresses the constraints faced by its members: 
[P]rivate sector investors have a fiduciary responsibility on behalf of 
clients. In many cases, these are public pension funds and the 
savings vehicles of working people who have been severely affected 
by the dual shocks of Covid-19 and the economic recession. Their 
aim is simply to maximise their investment returns. Investment 
managers are legally bound to honor their contracts and cannot 
simply choose to donate their clients’ money on their behalf, no 
matter how pressing the cause.
(Parameswaran, 2020) 
This makes it institutionally harder to agree to a debt relief package as compared to credi-
tor banks, which are the principals themselves: They manage their own resources, for 
example by granting a loan to a developing country or buying that government’s bond. 
The fiduciary role and the relatively large number of fund managers make the «free rider» 
problem particularly severe. In essence this means that each creditor has an incentive to 
not provide any debt relief in the hope that others will do so instead. There are no easy ways 
to overcome this collective action problem. The IIF, as the advocacy group of the sector, 
cannot be expected to proactively rally its members around the flag of offering debt relief. 
To reach a point where borrowing countries’ governments feel incentivised to ask for PSI in 
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debt restructuring, the official sector needs to take on a leading role. The most likely 
candidate to fill that void is the IMF.
The IMF is precluded from providing financial support to member countries if the sovereign 
debt is deemed to be unsustainable, unless the programme includes specific mitigating 
measures such as a debt restructuring to restore debt sustainability. Central to making the 
call on debt sustainability is the IMF and World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Analysis 
framework. Although the core of the framework is a quantitative exercise, it does require 
the exercise of analytical judgement. Although debt relief via a restructuring may be a 
precondition for the IMF’s engagement if it believes public debt is unsustainable, the 
decision to seek debt relief ultimately remains the prerogative of the member country. In 
cases where the judgement on debt sustainability is deemed to be more borderline, the IMF 
may not require a definite debt restructuring, but it could demand a more limited reprofil-
ing of existing debt to restore sustainability (IMF, 2015). This would be akin to pri-
vate-sector participation in DSSI, providing assistance in situations of liquidity stress, but 
not in cases of outright insolvency. 
Although the decision to call for debt restructuring or reprofiling rests formally with the 
government of the borrowing country, the strained finances of many low-income countries 
would make it hard to reject IMF funding options, even if the attached condition were one 
of a debt management operation that might lead to a default being declared. The leverage 
the IMF currently holds over borrowing members becomes apparent when considering that, 
since March 2020, it has approved unprecedented financing for more than 80 member 
states, pledging around US$100 billion (IMF, 2020d).
How can the IMF’s role be utilised to prevent governments from kicking the can down the 
road by treating a potential solvency crisis as one of liquidity? We recommend a way 
forward for the G20 to request the IMF and the World Bank to perform a new set of Debt 
Sustainability Analysis assessments for all DSSI-eligible countries, as well as other coun-
tries where debt sustainability is not a given. Given the renewed deepening of the global 
health crisis, this seems to be a reasonable request to make under any circumstances, as 
some key assumptions will need to be recalibrated. This collective round of Debt Sustaina-
bility Analysis assessments should then be used to take decisions on which countries will 
need to engage in a restructuring or reprofiling of their commercial debt as a precondition 
for extended IMF financial engagement.
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If not now, then when?
The lesson from the 1980s debt crisis must not be forgotten: By playing for time with an 
«extend and pretend» approach, the ultimate social and economic costs will inexorably 
rise. In the 1980s, it took seven years from the Mexican default in 1982 until the unveiling 
of the Brady Plan, which acknowledged for the first time that some debt relief would be 
required for debtors to recover. The delay led to the much lamented «decada perdida», or 
lost decade. In light of the multiple and growing social development and climate challeng-
es, we cannot afford another lost decade, much less so for the most vulnerable nations on 
the planet. In the 1980s, there was an explanation for delaying the inevitable. Several US 
money center banks were so exposed to Latin American debtors that a swift round of 
restructurings would have dangerously diminished their capital positions, risking a finan-
cial crisis. Only once their balance sheets were sufficiently repaired could debt be written 
off. Today, the exposures to DSSI countries are negligible in comparison, and mostly with 
unleveraged asset management firms. There are no financial stability risks to acting now.
The advantage of such a coordinated approach would be that it helps to short-circuit the 
disincentives of low-income governments to proactively call for PSI. It would also over-
come the coordination problem among borrowers: Apprehension of stigma will be holding 
governments back to be the first government to ask for PSI. The fear of being singled out, 
even if others follow swiftly behind, is not unjustified: Until today, the 1980s debt crisis is 
most often associated with Mexico, which was the first of many nations to declare a unilat-
eral debt service moratorium. If all countries are assessed simultaneously, the first-default-
er stigma will not apply, as several can be expected to be slotted into the «unsustainable» 
category simultaneously. Only when a restructuring and the concomitant temporary sover-
eign default are accepted as part of the solution for some countries – rather than part of the 
problem – will the countries at risk be able to put their focus on the social and environmen-
tal development goals that will benefit their citizens and the global population at large. All 
it takes is for a central process coordinator to step forward and make the necessary call to 
arms. We believe the IMF, supported by the G20, is the only player in town to take on that 
role.
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6. The Way Forward
The international institutions need to review the debt sustainability of developing countries. 
This must be followed by coordinated action involving all creditors – public and private – to 
restructure and, where necessary, reduce debt. The G20 should take a lead in spearheading 
a bold response to this unprecedented crisis and call on debtors and creditors to implement 
swift solutions to the looming debt crisis in the Global South.
Debt relief has to be part of a broader agenda for enabling green and inclusive recoveries in 
countries around the world. A debt relief effort of the appropriate scale should be coupled 
with a new and ambitious allocation of SDRs and significant new capital mobilised from 
development finance institutions in order to provide the fiscal space for emerging markets 
and developing countries to adopt sustained counter-cyclical responses to the crisis. To 
achieve a just transition, large and sustained increases in public investment will be necessary.
The proposal put forward in this report can help to address the immediate debt challenges 
facing the Global South. Going forward, however, a broader reform of global debt govern-
ance is necessary. As recently highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a «reform of the 
international debt architecture is urgently needed». The IMF (2020e) has recently put 
forward reform options for the international architecture for resolving sovereign debt 
involving private-sector creditors. The international community should explore options for 
a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism – as was originally proposed by the IMF two 
decades ago (IMF, 2003) – to deal with debt crises.
Our proposal is aimed at providing developing countries the fiscal space at a critical time 
to address the three crises they are facing: the health and social crisis, the debt crisis, and 
the climate and environmental crisis. We highlight climate action for three reasons. First, 
climate science is clear about the great urgency for scaling-up climate mitigation to avoid 
catastrophic climate change. Second, even if climate mitigation efforts are successful, 
large-scale investments in adaptation will be needed to protect people from the effects of 
the global environmental change that is already happening. It is important to emphasise 
that the effects of climate change will disproportionately harm the poor – scaling-up 
climate adaptation is also a matter of climate justice. Third, research has shown that 
greater climate vulnerability is increasing sovereign risk and the cost of capital, and hence 
undermining public finances. Therefore, investment in adaptation is a good investment and 
will contribute to future debt sustainability.
But to be clear, neither efforts aimed at climate mitigation nor adaptation can be successful 
if the social dimension is ignored. This is why debt relief needs to be coupled with policies 
that are aimed at a just transition. Without large-scale debt relief and efforts aimed at 
facilitating a green and inclusive recovery, the international community can abandon its 
hopes of achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
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